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Recent Developments in Eminent
Domain in Arkansas
Robert R. Wright*
This discussion of recent highway condemnation cases in Ar-
kansas is directed almost entirely toward decisions of the Arkansas
Supreme Court since November 15, 1963, and does not include any
decisions subsequent to March 15, 1965. This article is intended
partially to supplement the Arkansas Eminent Domain Digest' by
providing a discussion of those cases decided after publication of
that volume. Although this article will discuss the cases in greater
depth than in the Digest presentation, this is intended to be more of
a survey of the Arkansas decisions than a study in depth of any
particular phase of the law of eminent domain.
DRAINAGE DISTRICTS
Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Sub-district No. 3 of Grassy
Lake and Tyronza Drainage Dist. No. 9,2 which involved the con-
demnation of land lying in an improvement district, raised some
questions which had not previously been adjudicated in Arkansas.
The majority opinion stated that the question presented by these
two cases, which had been consolidated for trial in the lower court,
was this: Does a drainage district, by reason of its uncollected as-
sessment of benefits, have a property interest in land within the dis-
trict for which it is entitled to compensation in addition to the award
made to the landowner? The trial court had said that it did have
such right and that the drainage district was entitled to recover a
sum equal to the total amount of all unpaid future district assess-
ments that had been levied by the district against the land being
condemned. What was involved in the condemnation portion of the
case was a taking in fee simple by the highway commission, the ex-
istence of a rather typical drainage district situation in which the
district had been organized some years ago, benefits had been asses-
sed, funds had been raised through bond issues which were secured
by a pledge of the assessed benefits, and taxes had been levied in
annual installments against the assessment of benefits to make pay-
ment of the bonds. The district had about 16 years left on its out-
standing bonded indebtedness.
*Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Continuing Legal Education
and Research, University of Arkansas Law School.
Many of the comments in this paper are adapted from the author's talk
on "Recent Developments in Arkansas" at the Institute on Eminent Domain
and Condemnation, conducted by the Arkansas Bar Association and the Uni-
versity Law School on January 28-29 in Little Rock, as a part of the annual
mid-year meeting of the Bar.
'The ARKANSAS EMINENT DOMAIN DIGEST was published by Bobbs-Merrill
in the summer of 1964 and resulted from a research project. The author of this
article was Research Director of the project and served in that capacity and as
editor of the digest.
'237 Ark. 614, 376 S.W.2d 259 (1964).
The two cases which had been consolidated proceeded under
two different fact situations in that in one the Commission had ac-
quired a fee simple title from the landowner without making the
drainage district a party and then had brought an action against the
drainage district alleging that nothing additional was due to the dis-
trict, whereas in the other case the Commission had joined the land-
owner and the district as defendants in a condemnation suit. In the
latter situation, the issue was tried with respect to the landowner's
interest alone, and the landowner received an award. The district
contended that it had a separate compensable property right, but
the supreme court held to the contrary. The court felt that the
district had a remedial right against the land which was a lien or
something in the nature of lien. The court pointed out that the con-
demnation award takes the place of the land, and the lienholder's
remedy is to proceed against the award to the extent of his interest.
But here, the district had chosen to forego any claim against the
landowner's award and insist on a distinct cause of action against
the condemnor.
One problem which the court encountered in this case was that
caused by the district's substituted right to levy future taxes against
the assessed benefits. The condemnation eradicated this power, but
the court felt that the district's power to collect these benefits
should be regarded as an element in the landowner's fee simple es-
tate, pointing out that the value of the land had been greatly en-
hanced as a result of the drainage district, and when the condemnor
pays for the increased market value of the land, it also pays for the
benefits conferred by the drainage district.
The essential holding in the Grassy Lake case, insofar as the
condemnation problem is involved, is rather simple and fundamental.
It is a basic tenet of the law of eminent domain in Arkansas and
throughout the United States that when land is condemned, the con-
demnor pays the true market value of the land.3 But the condemnor
only pays once; there is no double payment for the same piece of
land. All those who have an interest in the land are takers from the
award paid by the condemnor to the extent of their respective in-
terests. 4 It is up to the trial court to balance the interest of the
'Little Rock Junction Ry. v. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381, 5 S.W. 792 (1887);
Lazenby v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 231 Ark. 601, 331 S.W.2d 705
(1960); Scott v. State, 230 Ark. 766, 326 S.W.2d 812 (1959); I ORGEL, VALUA-
TION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 17 (2d ed. 1953). See the collection of Ar-
kansas cases in WRIGHT, ARKANSAS EMINENT DOMAIN DIGEST § 5.5E (1964).
'2 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.3(4) (Rev. 3d ed. 1963),
states that "each of the owners . . .of an interest in or lien upon the property,
has a corresponding right to share in the award. It follows that the award may
be apportioned in accordance with the respective interests . .. The matter of
such apportionment is of no concern to the condemnor and is a problem in
which only the claimants are involved." JAHR, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 124 (1953), sums up the situation succinctly: "Where the fact-finding body (a
court or jury) makes awards for separate interests in a condemned property,
each interest represented receives a portion of the value of the total. But
where the award is a lump sum representing all the different interests in the
condemned property, there must be a division of the total award between the
respective interests therein. The award now stands in place of the land. If
parties, with respect to payment of the proceeds, but out of the
award will come the payment of all interests, liens, or other claims
which may be involved.5 In the Grassy Lake case, therefore, what-
ever rights the drainage district had were to be asserted against the
award, and the Arkansas court quite properly so held.
This is especially true with respect to liens. Generally speak-
ing, a lien is not a proprietary interest in land, but is simply a remedy
to be asserted against the land which may actually be impaired
without compensation, and when land subjected to a lien is taken
by eminent domain, the lienholder is neither entitled to be joined
as a party nor to recover from the condemnor.6 The Arkansas
Supreme Court concluded that the drainage district had a lien
against the assessment of benefits which was "a remedial right
against the land."7 In addition to this remedy, the court concluded
also that the district had a substantive right to levy taxes in the
future against benefits. The court regarded this power as an ele-
ment in the landowner's fee simple estate (for which payment had
already been made). The general rule is that the holder of a tax lien
does not even have an interest which makes him a necessary party
to a condemnation proceeding (although he may be joined, if de-
sirable).8 Although Nichols points out that there is conflict of au-
thority over whether a tax lien is "property" within the meaning of
the particular statutes involved,9 in any event, as in other liens, the
lien is payable out of the award rather than payable separately by
the condemnor.10
Therefore, the obvious answer for the improvement district in
this case was to assert a claim against the award to the extent of
its interest
In the course of the case the drainage district pointed out that
if the potential tax liability of the condemned land were extinguish-
ed without compensation to the district, the result might be to in-
the total award happens to be in the full amount of the separate interests in the
property, there is generally no problem in the division of the total. But sup-
pose the award is insufficient to pay for the value of the separate interests? In
that case, the total award must be divided in proportion to the value of those
respective interests. The apportionment of, the award is based on equitable
principles, and the division of the proceeds in case of a deficiency is governed
by equity. The proper apportionment of the sum awarded concerns only the
several claimants; and the condemnor has no interest in such apportionment."
'Numerous cases so hold. See, e.g., Porter v. Columbia County, 75 So. 2d
699 (Fla. 1954); City of Houston v. Culmore, 154 Tex. 376, 278 S.W.2d 825
(1955); St. Louis Housing Authority v. Evans, 285 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. 1955);
State v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P.2d 783 (1954).
'See 2 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 5.74.
'237 Ark. at 616, 376 S.W.2d at 260. The court said that this was a lien,
but added that it was a remedial right which "if not actually a lien" was "at
least in the nature of a lien."
82 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 5.744. See also 1 ORGEL, op. Cit. supra
note 3, § 116.
02 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 5.744.
"Cuyahoga County, Ohio v. United States, 294 F.2d 775 (Ct. Cl. 1961);
United States v. 3 Parcels of Land, 198 F. Supp. 529 (ND. Iowa 1961); City
of Chicago v. Mardot, 25 Ill. 2d 60, 182 N.E.2d 716 (1962); Sanitary District
v. Murphy, 261 11. 269, 103 N.E. 1001 (1913); Application of Cantro, 198 Misc.
925, 103 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1950).
crease the payments which other landowners in the district would
have to make. Carried to its logical conclusion, this would mean
that the district's outstanding bonds would have been rendered
valueless had the condemnor elected to take all the land in the im-
provement district. The court chose to leave this question "unex-
plored until it arises."11 Fortunately, lawyers and law professors are
not so burdened by judicial restraint. Again, the remedy would seem
to be for the district to assert its claim, whether it be designated a
"lien," "tax lien," "remedial right," or "spec.al asse-sm nt," against
the award itself. Properly, it would seem that what we are dealing
with in this case is a special assessment which constitutes a lien
against the property. No matter what the nature of the right may
be said to be in this case, however, if it constitutes a legally enforce-
able claim or charge against the land in any form, it is enforceable
out of the award.1 2 If it does not, it would be no more enforceable
against the condemnor than it would against the award of the con-
demnee. Reason, however, compels the conclusion that the bonds
would be paid out of the award in the event of a total condemnation.
Obviously, except for the drainage district and the issuance of the
bonds, the value of this land as swamp land would have been mini-
mal. Since the improvements resulting from funds obtained through
issuance of the bonds greatly multiplied the value of the land, it is
only reasonable that the payment of the balance due on the bonds
should be paid out of the award. This is the usual rationale for pay-
ment of assessments levied upon land as the result of public im-
provements undertaken for the benefit of that and similarly situated
land.'3
The dissent in Grassy Lake, in discussing the land acquired by
condemnation, contended that the Highway Commission was liable
because "of the way this case was tried" and because of a stipula-
tion that the interest of the drainage district was not to be determin-
ed at the time of trial or settlement of the landowner's interest.14
237 Ark. at 618, 376 S.W.2d at 261.
"Tax liens (see 2 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 5.744) are enforceable
ot of the award the same as other liens; and of course, a lienor can proceed
against the award. (2 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 5.74) As for the obli.
gation of the landowner to pay for "special assessments" out of the award, one
writer states: "The state decisions uniformly hold that a condemnee is liable for
the amount of any 'special assessments' levied against the land and due and pay-
able at the time the condemnation proceedings are instituted . . . . An assess-
ment is a charge which is 'predicated upon the principle of equivalents or bene-
fits which are peculiar to the persons or property charged therewith, and which
[is] assessed or appraised according to the measure or proportion of such
equivalents.' By hypothesis, then, the condemnee's property had its value en-
hanced when the public improvement financed through the 'special assessment'
was made; such enhanced value will have been reflected in the award of dam-
ages to the condemnee; and the imposition on the condemnee of the full amount
of the 'special assessment' still due and owing is theoretically sound and wholly
consistent with decisions . . prorating the current tax liability of the same
condemnee in the same proceedings." Hilpert, Liability for State and Local
Taxes and Assessments in Federal Condemnation Proceedings, 10 OHIO ST. L.J.
17, 24-25 (1949). See also, Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 522 (1956); 79 A.L.R. 116
(1932).
"See note 12 supra.
"237 Ark. at 618, 376 S.W.2d at 261.
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The dissent points out that under the applicable drainage district
statute,15 the district was vested with an order having all the force
of a judgment, which assessed the tax, and that the tax was a lien
on the property. Thus, the dissent views the district as holding a
judgment lien against the land under the statute. Since this lien was
properly payable out of the award, the dissent argues that the High-
way Commission "properly made the District a party defendant ...
and that the District was entitled to be paid out of any award
made; but when the Highway Commission elected . . . to try the
landowner's rights in one case and then try the District's case sep-
arately, the Highway Commission necessarily became liable to the
District for the amount of the District's lien."16
If the Highway Commission did in fact lull the improvement
district into believing that it had a separate cause of action against
it which could be asserted separately, it might be contended that
the Commission in effect waived its right to object to a separate
determination of indebtedness to the district. But the Highway
Commission seems never to have conceded that the drainage dis-
trict had a separate cause of action against it, and indeed that seems
to be the crux of the issue in this case, as far as the condemnation
question is concerned. If the drainage district had wanted to assert
its rights against the award, it could very easily have done so; but
it seems to have ignored that possibility and proceeded directly
against the condemnor, against whom the majority correctly de-
termined it had no cause of action. All the stipulation says is that
the rights of the drainage district are reserved for separate determ-
ination. Since it has no separate rights against the condemnor, that
determination has been made.
A more serious question is presented with respect to the land
which the Highway Commission acquired directly by deed from the
owner. The dissent felt that the Commission should be required to
pay future accruing assessments on the benefits the same as any
other grantee.' 7 There are a number of cases which have adopted
the view that assessments for local benefits do not constitute "taxes"
within the exemption of the sovereign from taxation.' 8 Other courts,
15ARK. STAT. ANN., § 21-542 (Repl. 1956).
1237 Ark. at 618, 376 S.W.2d at 261.
"Ibid. The dissent based this contention on ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-401
(1947), which provides that liens for improvement district assessments on
taxes "shall run with the land and be assumed by the grantee."
"Justice McFaddin's able dissenting opinion cited Willis Creek Drainage
Dist. v. Yazoo County, 209 Miss. 849, 48 So. 2d 498 (1950) in support of this
view. In that case the Mississippi court held that the statute exempting public
property from taxation was not intended to abate an existing judgment lien
"against land subsequently purchased by the State or one of its subdivisions."
48 So. 2d at 501. Similarly, in State of Minnesota, Dep't of Rural Credit v.
Washington County, 207 Minn. 530, 292 N.W. 204 (1940), it was held that by
statute the state's title to lands acquired through mortgage foreclosures was sub-
ject to drainage improvement assessment liens accruing prior to the mortgage.
In State ex rel. Board of Supervisors of So. Fla. Conservancy Dist. v. Warren,
57 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1951), it was held by the Florida court that state lands
could be assessed for drainage, and the lien thereon for drainage taxes could be
made of equal dignity with the lien for state and county taxes. Montana has
held that state lands within an irrigation district are subject to assessment, since
however, have held that while special assessments for drainage dis-
tricts may be imposed on public property, the lien is not enforce-
able, and there must be express statutory authorization to permit
expenditure of funds by a public agency for payment of assess-
ments.' The Washington court held that state lands could not be
subjected to special assessments for local improvements unless there
were express statutory authority. 20 The majority rule in the United
States is in accord with the view that there must be express legis-
lative authorization before state property will be subject to special
assessments. 2' Moreover, there must be a clear statutory expression
of the intent of the state to submit to such special assessments.22
Arkansas holds to this general view. In Waterworks Improvement
Dist. No. 2 v. Logan County,2 3 the court stated that while public
property is not exempt under the Constitution from assessments for
local improvements, the statutes which authorized the creation of
the improvement districts did not provide that property exempted
by the Constitution for taxation for general revenue purposes should
be taxed for improvement district purposes, and in the absence of
legislative authorization, such property could not be taxed.24
A more pertinent question in this case, however, is what hap-
pens when the state acquires land on which there is an outstanding
improvement district indebtedness. In Harris v. Little Red River
Levee Dist. No. 2,25 the court was concerned with lands on which
the state had obtained title due to unpaid taxes. The court stated
that it had previously "ruled that the forfeiture and sale of lands to
the state for nonpayment of taxes has the effect of suspending the
enforcement of special improvement taxes against the lands during
the time the title thereto remains in the state or until the lands re-
turn to private ownership. ' 26 Similarly, in Stringer v. Conway County
Bridge Dist.,27 the Arkansas court held that although sale to the
irrigation assessments are not taxes within the constitutional and statutory ex-
emption; however, the importance of this holding was considerably modified by
the ruling that state lands could not be sold to satisfy the lien, and the Court
left it up to the state to find "some means to discharge the lawful assessments
levied." Toole County Irrigation Dist. v. State, 104 Mont. 420, 67 P.2d 989, 993
(1937).
"Board of Public Instruction v. Little River Valley Drainage Dist., 119
So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1960).
"Appeal of State, 60 Wash. 2d 380, 374 P.2d 171 (1962). A statute in
Washington allowed the state's land to be subject to local assessment if "spe-
cially benefited."
2148 AM. JuR. Special or Local Assessments § 87. See also Annot., 90
A.L.R. 1137, 1143 (1934). In Arkansas see Board of Comm'ners v. Arkansas
County, 179 Ark. 91, 14 S.W.2d 226 (1929).
12State v. Kilburn, 81 Conn. 9, 69 Atl. 1028 (1908); Huntsville v. Madi-
son County, 166 Ala. 389, 52 So. 326 (1910).
" 115 Ark. 257, 258, 244 S.W. 4 (1922).
2'This decision was based on Board of Imp. v. School Dist., 56 Ark. 335,
19 S.W. 969 (1892).
".188 Ark. 975, 69 S.W.2d 877 (1934).
"2Id., at 978, 69 S.W.2d at 879.
"188 Ark. 481, 65 S.W.2d 1071 (1933). This same result was reached in
Turley v. St. Francis County Road Improvement Dist. No. 4, 171 Ark. 939, 287
S.W. 196 (1926); and Wyatt v. Beard, 179 Ark. 305, 15 S.W.2d 990 (1929). See
also Hopper v. Chandler, 183 Ark. 469, 36 S.W.2d 398 (1931) (which held that
a sale of lands by a road improvement district while title was in the State was
state does not extinguish improvement district liens, "it . . . sus-
pends the lien while the title is in the State.' '2s
While these cases involve sales to the state for delinquent taxes,
a clear parallel may be drawn. As long as the state keeps the prop-
erty, the lien is suspended and cannot be enforced.
Some rather substantial authority to the contrary is available,
however. In United States v. Alabama,29 the United States Supreme
Court had before it a case involving a state statute creating an in-
choate lien as of the tax day for taxes to be assessed during the
year. Chief Justice Hughes, in his opinion, pointed out that enforce-
ment proceedings against the federal government w- uld be unavail-
ing without its consent. But insofar as the validity of the lien was
concerned:
The United States took the conveyances with knowledge of the state
law fixing the lien as of October 1st. That law in creating such
liens for the taxes subsequently assessed in due course and making
them effective as against subsequent purchasers did not contravene
the Constitution of the United States and we perceive no reason why
the United States, albeit protected with respect to proceedings against
it without its consent, should stand, so far as the existence of the
liens is concerned, in any different position from that of other
purchasers of lands in Alabama who take conveyances on and after
the specified tax date."0
Other federal cases, holding that the obligation to pay future
assessments for drainage districts is determined by the law of the
particular state involved, have required the federal government to
make payment of such assessments.3' These cases have gone on the
premise that the government's sovereign immunity which protects
it from general tax liability is not applicable in the case of special
assessments, which are not included in such exemption and which
are not "taxes" but are apportionment of the costs of improvements
among the lands benefited.
As these federal cases point out, there is very little way to re-
concile these cases except on the basis of local law. Under the Ar-
kansas Constitution, there cannot be a taking of private property for
public use without just compensation.32 Since the general rule is that
a lien is not a proprietary interest or estate,3 3 the Arkansas court
void); and Miller v. Cache River Drainage Dist. No. 2, 205 Ark. 618, 170
S.W.2d 371 (1943).
"188 Ark. at 483, 65 S.W.2d at 1072.
2 313 U.S. 274 (1941).
"Id. at 282. See also Mullen Benevolent Corp. v. United States, 290 U.S.
89 (1933), in which the government had no liability for reassessment of bene-
fits, but had paid all liens, which included outstanding assessments, in acquiring
title.
"See United States v. Florea, 68 F. Supp. 367 (D. Ore. 1945), and United
States v. Aho, 68 F. Supp. 358 (D. Ore. 1944).
"2ART. 2, § 22.
32 NICHOLs, op. cit. supra note 4, § 5.74. However, the dissent in Grassy
Lake pointed out that under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-401 (1947), improvement
district assessments "shall run with the land and be assumed by the grantee,"
which certainly seems a legislative attempt to elevate these to a status at least
equalling that of a covenant running with the land.
has not felt constrained to require payment for it by the condemnor.
Another conclusion which seems clearly inferable is that the Arkan-
sas court has not chosen to place special assessments in any special
category insofar as the state's sovereign immunity from taxation is
concerned.
The main interest of the dissent in the Grassy Lake case seems
to be concern over the fact that the drainage district and its bond-
holders might go without compensation for the lien and benefits in
question. In the case of condemnation proceedings, the remedy is
against the award. But in the case of outright purchase by the state,
where is the remedy? The majority opinion does not clearly pro-
vide the answer. It might be contended that the remedy is found in
asserting a cause of action against the landowner, based on the theory
that the payment for the land was in lieu of condemnation and was
in the nature of an award in which the drainage district has an in-
terest. Admittedly, this theory is rather rough around the edges;




One Arkansas case, which was actually decided on the basis
of the lower court's error in disallowing a drawn and struck jury,
but which also considered the question of testimony by experts was
Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Stanley.34 This case cited two
other Arkansas cases35 as authority for the proposition that even an
expert's opinion is not substantial evidence if he fails to demonstrate
a fair or reasonable basis for his conclusion. In the comparatively
recent case of Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Johns, 36 the court
ruled that an expert witness, after having established his qualifica-
tions and his familiarity with the subject of the inquiry, is ordinarily
in a position to state his opinion and need not on direct examination
state the facts upon which his opinion is based. Arkansas State High-
way Comm'n v. Ptak,3 7 however, indicated that the testimony of an
expert who was not sufficiently versed as to the physical facts con-
cerning the properties specifically involved could be discredited on
cross-examination on that basis. The apparent synthesis of these
cases is that while an expert need not state the basis of his opinion
on direct examination, his testimony can be discredited on cross-
examination by showing that he is not acquainted with the physical
facts concerning the property in question.3 8 The rule that an ex-
"237 Ark. 664, 375 S.W.2d 229 (1964).
"City of Little Rock v. Moreland, 231 Ark. 996, 334 S.'W.2d 229 (1960);
Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Stanley, 234 Ark. 428, 353 S.W.2d 173
(1962). See also Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Gladden, 238 Ark. 988,
991, 385 S.W.2d 934 (1965).
"236 Ark. 585, 367 S.W.2d 436 (1963).
'7236 Ark. 105, 364 S.W.2d 794 (1963).
"See WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 6.2D. In WRIGHT, A LEGAL ANALYSIS
OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN ARKANSAS (1964), it was stated: "This [rule] should
be corrected by the [proposed] code to provide that all witnesses should state
the basis for their opinion on direct examination. This would not preclude further
cross-examination on the subject, but it would set to rest the false proposition
that merely because a man is a real estate agent he becomes an expert and
pert need not state the basis of his opinion on direct examination
does not apply to non-expert witnesses, who must state the basis
on direct examination for the opinion to be admissible.3 9
In connection with opinions of experts, another recent Arkansas
case held that while comparable sales form a permissible basis for
an expert witness' opinion of the value of the property in contro-
versy, the expert should not be allowed to give his opinion about
the value of similar land in the vicinity in the absence of such a
sale.40
Testimony of the Landowner
Another evidentiary problem centers around testimony by the
landowner as to the value of his own land. (Is there really any
doubt about what his opinion will be?) Arkansas State Highway
Comm'n v. Weir41 upheld an award in which the only testimony to
sustain the judgment was that of the landowner. The Highway Com-
mission had contended that under the rule set forth in Hot Spring
County v. Prickett,42 the uncorroborated testimony of a landowner
would not support an award. The court stated that the Prickett case
did not hold that and that it actually only determined that the land-
owner's testimony would be considered as disputed. The landowner's
testimony in Prickett, said the court, was a conclusion not supported
by the facts.
Although the court did not say so, it should also be noted that
in Prickett the landowner gave no basis for his opinion and had no
experience in the real estate business. Under the rule pertaining to
non-expert testimony, that alone should have discredited his testi-
mony.4 3 Moreover, in the Weir case, an expert had testified that the
Weirs were damaged "something over" $26,000, which may have
provided some support for the $30,000 award granted by the trial
court, at least to the extent of $26,000.
Certainly the better rule would seem to permit the landowner
to testify but require him to state the basis for his opinion in order
that it may be weighed in its proper light. But a substantial question
can give an opinion without stating the basis of it." 5 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra
note 4, § 18.42(1), states that although there is authority to support the
proposition that an opinion witness need not give the reasons for his opinion on
direct examination, the absence of supporting evidentiary facts has been held
to affect the weight of the opinion, and it is generally held that he should tes-
tify as to the facts which substantiate his conclusion and explain the reasons
for this opinion.
"Ross v. Clark County, 185 Ark. 1, 45 S.W.2d 31 (1932).
"Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Sisson, 238 Ark. 720, 384 S.1W.2d
264 (1964).
-237 Ark. 692, 376 S.W.2d 257 (1964).
"229 Ark. 941, 319 S.W.2d 213 (1959).
"In another recent Arkansas case, Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v.
Gladden, 238 Ark. 988, 991, 385 S.W.2d 934, 936 (1965), the court properly
admitted the testimony of the landowner, stating: "Dr. Gladden, as a land-
owner, was not disqualified from giving his value opinion. Arkansas State
Highway Comm'n v. Muswick Cigar 8& Beverage Co., 231 Ark. 265, 329 S.W.2d
173. According to the record, he had bought and sold considerable property
within the city the past year and was familiar with the local real estate market."
arises as to the validity of the result in the Weir case. If the owner's
conclusion is viewed as sustained by the testimony of the expert
that the property in controversy was worth something over $26,000,
then the result (at least up to that figure) can be justified. But any
landowner would naturally view his land as being worth more than
an unbiased observer would. Following the Weir court's interpreta-
tion of the Prickett rule as being that the landowner's testimony
should be viewed as disputed testimony, how can the court disregard
substantial contrary testimony on behalf of the condemnor and the
fact that the testimony of the condemnee's own expert fell short of
the figure awarded? Yet the court positively stated that "it is not
absolutely necessary that the landowner's testimony be corroborat-
ed."44 Despite this statement, it is difficult to imagine a situation in
which a landowner's unsupported testimony would be legally suffi-
cient for a court to reasonably base the value of real estate on this
testimony in the face of substantial contrary evidence from witness-
es on both sides. Nichols states that "it is generally understood that
the opinion of the owner is so far affected by bias that it amounts
to little more than a definite statement of the maximum figure of his
contention. '45 To ignore substantial contrary evidence and base an
award on the landowner's testimony solely, when even the land-
owner's own expert witnesses cannot sustain the figure, is an unex-
plainable aberration which has no legal or reasonable justification.
Exclusion of the Testimony of a Witness
Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Jackson County Gin Co.,4 6
applied the well-established rule that if part of a witness' testimony
is admissible, a motion to exclude all of it is properly denied.
4 7
Similarly, Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Byrd,48 held that a
motion to strike only the inadmissible portion of a witness' testi-
mony was properly made. These holdings represented no departure
from past Arkansas cases.
Evidence of Market Value
It was held in the second Stanley case 49 that market value can-
not be determined by a mathematical formula, but by the test of
the willing buyer-willing seller relationship. The court's holding
was based on City of Little Rock v. Moreland,50 which is sometimes
referred to as the "bloating clay case," and involved no departure
from the principles followed in that case.
In Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v;-Sisson,51 the court re-
fused to admit testimony as to the worth of certain- removable chat-
'"237 Ark. at 694, 376 S.W.2d at 259.
455 NICHOLS, Op. Cit. supra note 4, § 18.4(2).
'"237 Ark. 761, 376 S.W.2d 553 (1964).
'4See Urban Renewal Agency of Harrison v. Hefley, 237 Ark. 39, 371
S.W.2d 141 (1963).
"237 Ark. 905, 377 S.W.2d 165 (1964).
4237 Ark. 664, 375 S.W.2d 229 (1964).
"231 Ark. 996, 334 S.W.2d 229 (1960).
"238 Ark. 720, 384 S.W.2d 264 (1964).
130
tels installed in a service station. This evidence had been introduced
to show the rental value of the station, but the court found the
issue to be the rental value of the real property, not the value of
chattels.5 2 Moreover, the landowner's receipt of rentals under a
lease had to be taken into consideration in computing her recovery,
since otherwise the state would be paying not only the value of the
leasehold but also the value of the unencumbered fee.
ELEMENTS OF LOSS AND "BEFORE AND AFTER" VALUE
A number of recent Arkansas cases have considered the ele-
ments to be included as constituting loss or in arriving at a determi-
nation of the loss involved.
Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Jackson County Gin Co.,58
and Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Carpenter,4 both held that
evidence as to moving costs may be considered in arriving at the
before and after value of property. This rule applies to movement
of buildings located on the premises. A 1959 Arkansas case, Arkansas
State Highway Comm'n v. Fox,"" held that it was error to award
removal expense for property belonging to a lessee where a lease-
hold is being condemned, and an older case 6 held that the cost of
removing personal property was not an element of damage to be
considered. Of course, the test is not the removal cost itself; the test
is the value of the property before the taking and the value of the
remainder after the taking, and this cost of movement of a house or
other property located on the premises is simply one element to be
considered in arriving at the before and after value.57 In another
case, the court ruled that in determining the before and after value,
it was error to present evidence as to the cost of an improvement
that had been removed from the land prior to condemnation.5 8 In
connection with before and after value, it is, of course, erroneous to
instruct the jury in a situation involving a partial taking that just
compensation is the "fair market value" of the land, rather than the
difference between the fair market value immediately before and
immediately after the taking. This was the court's holding in Myers
v. Arkansas State Highway Commn.59
Wenderoth v. Baker6" ruled that dust was not an element for
which damages could be awarded. This is in line with previous Ar-
5On admissibility of rental value, see generally Housing Authority of
Little Rock v. Winston, 226 Ark. 1037, 295 S.W.2d 621 (1956) and Desha v.
Independence County Bridge Dist. No. 1, 176 Ark. 253, 3 S.W.2d 969 (1928).
"'237 Ark. 761, 376 S.W.2d 553 (1964).
"'237 Ark.-46, 371 S.W.2d 535 (1963).
"230 Ark. 287, 322 S.W.2d 81 (1959).
"Kansas City So. R.R. v. Anderson, 88 Ark. 129, 113 S.W. 1030 (1908).
"Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Carpenter, 237 Ark. 46, 371 S.W.2d
535 (1963); Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Ptak, 236 Ark. 105, 364 S.W.2d
794 (1963).
"Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Byrd, 237 Ark. 905, 377 S.W.2d
165 (1964).
"'238 Ark. 734, 384 S.W.2d 258 (1964).
00238 Ark. 464, 382 .W.2d 578 (1964).
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kansas cases, which also hold that noise and other similar incon-
veniences resulting from condemnation are not compensable.61
Moreover, brokerage commissions, abstract costs, and deed fees
are inadmissible, and while a wide range of factors may be consid-
ered in determining market value, these selling costs cannot be in-
troduced as separate items of damage.
62
Business Income
It has long been the rule in Arkansas that in arriving at the
before and after value of property, profits from a business conducted
on the property cannot be considered. 63 A substantial number of
cases have held this in recent years, and two this past year which so
ruled were the Weir6 4 case, and Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v.
Taylor."6 In the Taylor case, the court stated that where a realtor-
developer had an arrangement whereby he would sell land to a third
party and still have a ninety day exclusive listing during which
period he could sell the lots for an additional commission, this loss
of business income could not be reasonably determined and was in-
admissible.66 The Weir case applied the view that income from a
farm is an exception to the rule that business income cannot be
used to form the basis for proof of damages. However, the court did
not attempt to distinguish the Weir ruling from the decision in City
of El Dorado v. Scruggs,67 which held that damages to a dairy busi-
ness occasioned by the discharge of sewage into a stream was not
compensable. The Weir case also involved a dairy business. In Weir,
a dairy and dairy farm were involved and an expert testified and
computed valuation by determining profits over a seven-year period.
What the expert was actually doing in the Weir case was determin-
ing profits from the dairy business operation as opposed to the ag-
ricultural profits of a farm, and the supreme court therefore may
have encroached somewhat on the usual rule that business profits
are not admissible. Also, the decision in El Dorado v. Scruggs may
have been substantially limited or even reversed by the Weir case.
The court did not cite City of El Dorado v. Scruggs in its opinion
however. In any event, what it has done in the Weir case is rule
that a "dairy farm," or "dairy business" which is connected to the
"'Campbell v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 183 Ark. 780, 38 S.W.2d
753 (1931); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Juneau, 178 Ark. 417, 10 S.W.2d 867 (1928).
"Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Massengale, 238 Ark. 1069, 386 S.W.
2d 710 (1965).
" Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Hood, 237 Ark. 202, 372 S.W.2d 387
(1963); Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Wilmans, 236 Ark 945, 370 S.W.2d
802 (1963); Hot Spring County v. Bowman, 229 Ark. 790, 318 S.W.2d 603
(1958); Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Addy, 229 Ark. 768, 318 S.W.2d
595 (1958); Hot Spring County v. Crawford, 229 Ark.. 518, 316 S.W.2d 834
(1958); Desha v. Independence County Bridge Dist. No. 1, 176 Ark. 253, 3
S.W.2d 969 (1928).
"4237 Ark. 692, 376 S.W.2d 257 (1964).
"5238 Ark. 278, 381 S.W.2d 438 (1964).
"The court did not discuss this evidence in terms of the business income
exclusion, although that is clearly what it appears to be. The court apparently
excluded this testimony because it was nebulous and uncertain.67113 Ark. 239, 168 S.W. 846 (1914).
farm, is within the agricultural exception, and that profits relating to
such a business operation may be admitted in evidence while profits
which pertain to other types of businesses cannot be admitted. The
Arkansas rule in connection with non-admissibility of business profits
is in accord with the general prevailing rule in this country.6 8 With
respect to admissibility of evidence as to farm profits, Orgel indi-
cates that "scattering decisions" support this rule.69 An Oklahoma
case 70 indicates that this evidence is often admitted simply to "shed
light upon the reasonableness of the value fixed by the evidence," 71
and a Kentucky case 72 states that this evidence is only used as a
means of measuring production. From an academic standpoint, it
would seem that the rule which excludes profits from a business
while permitting evidence of profits from farm property is inconsis-
tent and cannot be justified. The rationale is that business con-
ducted upon the condemned land and the fruits thereof are too un-
certain, remote and speculative to be used as the criterion of the
market value of the land, since the profits for any given period de-
pend upon many diverse circumstances. 73 Despite the existence of
agricultural price supports, it would seem that this same rule should
be no less true in connection with farm property. However, in place
of excluding testimony as to farm income, the alternative of allow-
ing the introduction of testimony as to business income for whatever
weight the court might wish to give it might be considered. It seems
unreasonable that a court should not be qualified to consider the
aspect of business profits, taking into account the fact that these are
transitory and cannot necessarily be viewed as "fixed." Although that
is not the general view in this country today, there has been some
statutory departure from the rule at least in three states.
7 4
Offers to Purchase
The court in the Jackson County Gin case75 followed a 1962
case76 in holding that an unaccepted offer to purchase property is
O'See 4 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 13.3. The owner cannot recover
the anticipated profits of his business which are lost by the taking of the land
upon which it is located, although evidence of profits may be considered in de-
termining market value where the profits are attributable to the character of the
land rather than to the character of the operator. See also, 5 NICHOLS, op. cit
supra note 4, § 19.3.
"01 ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 167. There is a fairly even division of
cases on either side of the controversy, according to Orgel. 1 ORGEL, op cit. supra
note 3, § 166.
"City of Cushing v. Pote, 128 Okla. 303, 262 Pac. 1070 (1928).
"1262 Pac. at 1070.
1"Kentucky Water Service Co. v. Bird, 239 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1951).
"3See 4 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 13.3 (1)-(2).
"Florida, New York and Vermont. See: FLORIDA STATUTES, § 73.10(4)
permitting damages for loss of business to be assessed and added to the value of
the land taken where the business is over five years old, is owned by and op-
erated on the condemnee's premises, and the taking is for right-of-way pur-
poses by certain designated public agencies; 19 VT. STAT. ANN. §212(2), No. 242,
Acts of 1957; Application of Huie, 11 App. Div. 2d 837, 202 N.Y.S.2d 954
(1960).
"237 Ark. 761, 376 S.W.2d 553 (1964).
"Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Elliott, 234 Ark. 619, 353 S.W.2d 526
(1962).
inadmissible to show the market value of the property. The court in
this earlier case discussed both the absolute exclusion rule and the
"Illinois rule" which admits the evidence if the proponent can show
that it was a bona fide offer for cash and was made by a person




One of the principal problems in condemnation cases in which
the county condemnation procedure 78 has been followed is that of
notice. Although Act 387 of 1965 amended the prior law to provide
for, publication of notice at least ten days prior to the hearing and
service of a copy of the order on all affected landowners within ten
days after the entry of order, the problem remains with respect to
previous county condemnation proceedings. The problem is illus-
trated by the recent case of Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v.
Montgomery7 9 in which there had been no publication of notice to
the landowners in the county court proceedings. Where there has
been no publication of notice (under the old procedure) and no
payment of compensation, the burden is on the condemnor to prove
actual notice to the landowner, or the judgment is void.80 To prove
actual notice, the Highway Commission must show actual entry on
the land. 8' In the Montgomery case, such an entry was found to
have taken place, the entry consisting of ditching and laying tile.
Consequently, the court held that actual notice had been established.
Another recent case, Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Dean,
8 2
held that the paving of an existing road was insufficient to put ad-
joining property owners on notice that additional land was being
taken. Similarly, Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Anderson,
8 3
held that the landowners did not have sufficient notice where a
county court in 1935 had entered an order condemning an addition-
al ten feet of right-of-way, which was never occupied, and no notice
was ever published. In Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Glad-
77In the Elliott case (note 76 supra), the court stated that the offered evi-
dence was inadmissible under either the absolute exclusion rule or the "Illinois
rule," but that "the evidence of an offer to purchase is not admissible to estab-
lish.the-fair market value of particular property." 234 Ark. at 623, 353 S.W.2d
at 529. This leaves the impression that Arkansas follows the absolute exclusion
rule.
"'The county condemnation procedure is found in ARK. STAT. ANN. §76-
917 (Repl. 1957). As mentioned in the article, the deficiencies as to notice
have been remedied in great measure by Act 387 of 1965. Nonetheless, this en-
tire county procedure is outmoded and antiquated. In the drafting of the pro-
posed highway code, it is the author's intention to eliminate this procedure and
substitute for it the same procedure followed by the State Highway Commission.
This will not cure the problem presented by county condemnation proceedings
which took place many years ago, however.
"237 Ark. 857, 376 S.W.2d 662 (1964).
"See Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Anderson, 234 Ark. 774, 354
S.W.2d 554 (1962).
"Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Cook, 233 Ark. 534, 345 S.W.2d 632
(1961); Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Holden, 217 Ark. 466, 231 S.W.2d
113 (1950).
2236 Ark. 484, 367 S.W.2d 107 (1963).
8a234 Ark. 774, 354 S.W.2d 554 (1962).
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den,84 also, the court found that there was no evidence that appellees
or their predecessors in title had ever received any compensation for
the land or that the order was published or that the landowners had
any notice of it until less than a year before this case was filed; and
in that situation (the Highway Commission having failed to show
actual entry), the court properly found the county court order to
be void. The question of notice is important since notice sets in
motion the one year statute of limitations8 5 provided in this county
condemnation procedure for the filing of claims. Under this statute,
prior to Act 387 of 1965, publication of notice or actual entry initiat-
ed the statutory period. Under the new provisions, however, the
statute of limitations begins to run from the date of service of the
county court order on the landowner. This is a vast improvement.
In Sloan v. Lawrence County"8 and in Arkansas State Highway
Comr'n v. Cook,87 the supreme court stated that the old county
court condemnation proceduress was defective, but not unconstitu-
tional, because it made no provision for giving notice to the land-
owner. The court held essentially the same thing as recently as mid-
January in Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Scott.89 In that case
the court found that there had been actual entry by the Highway
Commission, which provided the necessary notice, and with respect to
Scott's assertion that the county court orders were unconstitutional
due to absence of notice, the court stated that the appellee had con-
fused "notice of the proceedings" with "reasonable opportunity to
seek compensation."90 The court said that the latter was necessary
while the former was not required. The fact of the matter is that
the procedure previously provided in this county condemnation
statute failed to protect the rights of landowners and provided a
cumbersome and unsatisfactory method of condemning property. It
will still breed, for some time, continual litigation for the Highway
Commission, and it provided (and still provides, through application
of it) a method of cheating landowners out of their just compensa-
tion.9 1 The results in these cases, all too often, deprive the land-
owner of just compensation based on rather thin technicalities. If
there was enough to constitute "entry," the landowner had to act
affirmatively within a year or suffer the consequences. -Although
"238 Ark. 988, 385 S.W.2d 934 (1965).
"5ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-917 (Repl. 1957).
" 134 Ark. 121, 203 S.W. 260 (1918).
"7233 Ark. 534, 345 S.W.2d 632 (1961).
8"ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-917 (Repl 1957).
"238 Ark. 883, 385 S.W.2d 636 (1965).
9"d. at 888, 385 S.W.2d at 640.
"See WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2.8C. In WRIGHT, A LEGAL ANALYSIS
OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN ARKANSAS, op. cit. supra, note 36, at 18, it was said in
connection with this statute (before its amendment in the last legislature) and
these cases: "It appears to be possible in Arkansas for a landowner to have his
land taken legally without ever receiving just compensation and without having
any redress in the Courts! Such amounts to a lack of both procedural and
substantive due process, and it should be the aim of this code to remedy such
deficiencies. The answer is a specific mode of procedure which will make
mandatory the service of written notice at the time of the institution of the
proceedings upon all who claim an interest in the land, and in the case of non-
residents, by provision for publication of notice."
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personal notice is admittedly not required in order to meet the re-
quirements of due process, 2 there is considerable question as to
whether the old county condemnation procedure in Arkansas was
a legally sufficient substitute.
93
Despite the passage of Act 387, as mentioned, the old procedure
will haunt the courts for a long time to come. Most of the current
cases of this type result from county orders entered anywhere from
ten to forty years ago. The rule of the Sloan and Cook cases will
thus continue to provide occasional injustices for the next decade or
more, unless overruled.
CONSEQUENTIAL Loss OF VALUE
A few recent Arkansas cases have been concerned with a dimin-
ution in value due to condemnation of property not owned by the
complaining landowner. One such case was Arkansas State Highway
Comm'n v. McNeill,9 4 in which the landowner claimed damages
caused by the condemnation of adjoining property. The testimony
showed that erection of the highway on the adjoining property would
reduce the value of the landowner's residence by $10,000. But the
supreme court held that no recovery could be allowed. If land is
not actually taken, the court said, the owner cannot recover even
though the inconvenience to that landowner is greater than to the
public generally. An exception is a situation in which there are
special damages to that particular landowner, such as might result
from a change of grade or loss of access. In the McNeill case, the
landowner had actually asserted two theories although he had re-
lied largely on the second one. Under his first theory, he had sought
damages outright for loss of value due to the construction of the
highway on the adjoining property. Under his second theory, he had
asserted the destruction of a property interest in the form of a re-
strictive covenant on his and other property situated in the sub-
division which would have normally prevented the construction of
the highway. The Arkansas court stated that other states are about
equally divided, but in Arkansas, an award cannot be based on a
violation of a restrictive covenant because the loss is not due to the
actual -violation of the restriction but rather to the construction of
921 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 4.103(2). Nichols states that "it is
a fundamental maxim of the common law that he (the landowner) is entitled
to a hearing at some stage of the proceedings, and consequently to be notified
when the hearing is to take place." Yet in Arkansas, under the old procedure,
there might never be a hearing if the landowner did not assert his rights within
one year of the actual entry. Note in the Scott case (supra note 89) that the
county court order "was made without notice to the landowner, but gave him
one year in which to file his claim for the taking." 238 Ark. at 885-886, 385
S.W. 2d at 638.
3See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 89 A.L.R. 2d 1398
(1962), in which the Court stated that an elementary and fundamental re-
quirement of due process is notice reasonably calculated under all the circum-
stances to apprise interested parties of the pending of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections, and Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S.
398 (1928), in which it was held that notice must be reasonable and adequate
for the purpose.
4238 Ark. 244, 381 S.W.2d 425 (1964).
the highway.95 The loss, reasoned the majority opinion, would be
the same whether the covenant existed or not because the loss was
not due to the violation of the restrictive covenant but rather was
due directly to the construction of the highway, and such loss is
not compensable unless special damages result. There was a vigorous
dissent, which argued that a restrictive covenant is a property right
for which compensation should be paid under the Arkansas Consti-
tution.96
On October 12, 1964, in Wenderoth v. Baker,9 7 another decision
was rendered with respect to injury to property not taken. Here the
landowners argued that due to the construction of a new highway,
they would have to travel an additional half mile to get to town or
to school. The supreme court again held that a landowner whose
land is not being taken is not entitled to compensation for incon-
venience even though his inconvenience is greater than that suf-
fered by the general public.98 The court added:
It is not enough for a landowner to show that his damage differs from
that suffered by the general public. He must also show either that
part of his land has been taken or that a property right has been
invaded. Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.), § 14.1. It must often
happen that the value of a city lot is diminished as a result of the
condemnation of adjoining property for some distasteful purpose,
such as the construction of a city jail. But, as the court convincing-
ly demonstrated in City of Geary v. Moore, 181 Okla. 616, 75 P.2d
891, this is an injury 'for which the law does not, and never has,
afforded any relief.' 0
A case decided on the same day as the McNeill case, Arkansas
State Highway Comm'n v. Taylor,100 involved the development of
a subdivision, in which the developers had made improvements, in-
stalled utilities, filed a plat, and sold about one-third of the lots in-
volved. The Highway Commission had condemned a strip off of
the east side of the sixty-acre development. The supreme court held
that the owners could not consider this acreage as one tract and re-
cover damages to the part not taken, due to the fact that they had
divided it into lots, improved it and sold a substantial portion of the
lots. The court allowed recovery only for the damage to the lots
taken or partly taken as a result of condemnation, plus any special
damages (such as change of grade or loss of access) to the lots not
taken. Although this case technically did not involve an assertion of
"According to 2 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 5.73(1), the majority
view in the United States holds that a restrictive covenant (often characterized
as an equitable servitude) constitutes property in the constitutional sense, for
which compensation must be provided if the land in question is taken; Nichols
states: "Such restrictions constitute equitable easements in the land restricted,
and when such land is taken for a public use that will violate the restrictions,
there is a taking of the property of the owners of the land for the benefit of
which the restrictions were imposed." The owners are entitled to an award of
compensation for the destruction of their easements.
9See note 95 supra. The dissent is in accord with the majority view.
91238 Ark. 464, 382 S.W.2d 578 (1964).
"Citing Risser v. City of Little Rock, 225 Ark. 318, 281 S.W.2d 949
(1955).
"238 Ark. at 466, 382 S.W.2d at 579.100238 Ark. 278, 381 S.W.2d 438 (1964).
consequential damage to adjoining land, certainly that must have
been the main reason in attempting to recover for damages to the
entire subdivision since the "special damages" recoverable in con-
nection with the lots not taken would be peculiar and limited in
nature.
In all of these cases, whether more or less directly as in the
McNeill case, or by indirection as in Wenderoth v. Baker and the
Taylor case, the landowners and attorneys involved were facing a
problem and an issue which is gradually growing in intensity in the
law of eminent domain. Whether it is referred to as "consequential
damage" or "inverse condemnation," the problem is a very genuine
one whenever land is condemned for highways through residential
areas. The McNeill case illustrates it quite vividly. The landowner in
that case had not lost a single inch of land, but his property had
suffered substantial diminution in value due to the nearness of the
highway. He had lost without legally losing. A leading article in the
Virginia Law Review quotes with favor this penetrating analysis of
the New Hampshire court:
The vital issue then is, whether the injuries complained of amount
to a taking of the plaintiffs' property within a constitutional mean-
ing of those terms .... The constitutional prohibition (which exists
in most, or all, of the states) has received in some quarters, a con-
struction which renders it of comparatively little worth, being in-
terpreted much as if it read, - 'No person shall be divested of the
formal title to property without compensation, but he may without
compensation, be deprived of all that makes the title valuable.
To constitute a 'taking of property,' it seems to have sometimes been
necessary and held necessary that there should be 'an exclusive
appropriation,' 'a total assumption of possession,' 'a complete ouster,'
an absolute or total conversion of the entire property, 'a taking of
the property all together.' These views seem to us to be founded
on a misconception of the meaning of the term 'property,' as used
in the various state constitutions.' 0'
Can the view of the New Hampshire court, although represent-
ed by this rather old case, be viewed as representing the developing
trend within the country? Nichols states that the modem and pre-
vailing view is that any substantial interference with private prop-
erty which destroys or lessens its value, or by which the owner's
right to its use or enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged
or destroyed, is in fact and in law, a "taking" in the constitutional
sense to the extent of the damages suffered even though the title and
possession of the owner remains undisturbed.10 2 In support of that
statement, it might be pointed out that pollution of the air; destruc-
tion of light, air, view and. access; some types of regulation; change
in grade, may all amount to a taking for which compensation will be
awarded.10 3 But the situation discussed by Nichols involves actual
"'Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent Do-
main, 48 VA. L. REV. 437, 443 (1962), quoting from Eaton v. B.C. & M.R.R.,
51 N.H. 504, 12 Am. Rep. 147 (1872).
1022 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 6.3.
..'See Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 1 of Sheridan v. Jones, 199 Ark. 534,
134 S.W.2d 551 (1939) (pollution of water); Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 1 of
Wynne v. Fiscus, 128 Ark. 250, 193 S.W. 521 (1917) (pollution of air);
Campbell v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 183 Ark. 780, 38 S.W.2d 753
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nonphysical taking, and the situations mentioned in which there has
been no appropriation of land all involve "special" or "peculiar"
damages to the tract involved, not simply loss of value.
10 4
Under the Arkansas Constitution, land does not have to be
actually taken; it can be damaged for public use and compensation
received for same.10 5 This provision has given rise in at least thirty
states to recovery for various forms of consequential damages. 106
Again, however, it should be noted that despite this provision and
the allowance of some forms of consequential damages, a distinction
is drawn between damages to the remainder where part of the land
is taken and consequential damages to a tract where no part of it
is appropriated. In the latter situation, as mentioned, there must be
"special" or "peculiar" damages in order for there to be a recovery,
and simple loss of value is ordinarily not enough to qualify. 0 7
Most jurisdictions have rejected the argument of the land-
owners in McNeill that recovery should be allowed when no prop-
erty was taken but when public use of adjoining land caused an as-
certainable depreciation of the present market value.10 8 As men-
tioned, compensation has been denied unless the loss sustained falls
within some narrow concept of damage. Moreover, in some states
the present trend seems to be to curtail rather than liberalize re-
covery for consequential damages. 10 9 The reason for the rejection
of such assertion is obvious. To accept this premise would give rise
to a multiplicity of claims whenever a public improvement was con-
structed and might render highway construction inordinately ex-
pensive and thereby retard progress.110 It is also argued that this
would create an unjust and arbitrary discrimination against the
public and in favor of private improvement of land as well as in
favor of those damaged by public improvements as against those
damaged privately."' Thus, while the view favoring recovery for
(1931) (obstruction of free flow of light and air); Arkansas State Highway
Comm'n v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 231 Ark. 907, 333 S.W.2d 904 (1960)
(destruction of ingress and egress); Hot Spring County v. Bowman, 229 Ark.
790, 318 S.W.2d 603 (1958) (change of grade); Shellnut v. Arkansas State
Game & Fish Comm'n, 222 Ark. 25, 258 S.W.2d 570 (1953) (regulation pro-
hibiting hunting). But cf. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Hightower, 238
Ark. 569, 383 S.W.2d 279 (1964) (regulation of access driveways).
1042 NICHOLS op. Cit. supra note 4, § 6.4432(2).
05ART. 2, § 22.
1002 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 6.4432(2), states that under the con-
stitutional provision which requires the payment of compensation when prop-
erty is damaged (as the Arkansas Constitution does), consequential damages
may be recovered. Cases from thirty states are cited in support of this propo-
sition. Where the Constitution provides for compensation for a taking only,
damages are generally not compensable. 2 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, §
6.4432(1).
1072 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 6.441(1) and 6.4432(2); Spies &
McCoid, supra note 101, at 448.
'O'See note 107 supra.
... Spies & McCoid, supra note 101, at 448.
...See 1 ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 77; and 2 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra
note 4, § 6.441(1). The Spies and McCoid article questions the validity of this
assumption. Spies & McCoid, supra note 101, at 454.
112 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 6.551(1).
loss of value has received some support,' 12 it has generally been
rejected. 11
These reasons against a broadening of recovery to include
diminution in value of land not taken seem particularly compelling
in a state such as Arkansas where substantial funds for public im-
provements are not available in large quantities. The argument that
public highways are largely constructed with federal funds does not
eliminate the fact that there is still a fairly substantial portion of the
expense attributable to state funds (even if you can subscribe to the
"let's tap the federal government" viewpoint). The problem essen-
tially boils down to the policy question of whether to drain the
state highway budget and seriously retard road construction in or-
der to pay for these consequential damages. The conclusion must
necessarily be that from the standpoint of the public interest, the
Arkansas Supreme Court has reached the proper decision.
GENERAL AND SPECIAL BENEFITS
The problem in this area of condemnation litigation, as far as
the courts are concerned, is to determine what constitutes a benefit
which is peculiar to the land under consideration as opposed to a
benefit which accrues to the public generally. In the situation of
special benefits to the landowner's remaining property, these may
be offset against the award, whereas general benefits may not be
deducted. 1 4 In McMahan v. Carroll County,115 the supreme court
reiterated that where the public use for which a portion of land is
taken so enchances the remainder as to make it of greater value than
the whole was before the taking, the owner in such case has received
just compensation in benefits if these benefits are "local, peculiar
and special to the owner's land."116 The burden is on the condemnor
to prove that such special benefits have offset any damage suffered.
The court pointed out that although a paved highway may be of
benefit to the general public, it may also be a special benefit in cer-
tain circumstances. This case is in accord with previous Arkansas
law' 7 and with the rule in the United States generally."
8
"'McCandless v. Los Angeles, 214 Cal. 67, 4 P.2d 139 (1931); Britt v.
Shreveport, 83 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 1955); Armbruster v. Stanton-Pilger Drain-
age Dist., 169 Nab. 594, 100 N.W.2d 781 (1960); Hanks v. Port Arthur, 121 Tex.
202, 48 S.W.2d 944, 83 A.L.R. 278 (1932).
"'See note 107 supra.
.. 'Lazenby v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 231 Ark. 601, 331 S.W.2d
705 (1960); Ball v. Independence County, 214 Ark. 694, 217 S.W.2d 913
(1949); Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, 44 S.W. 707 (1897).
15238 Ark. 812, 384 S.W.2d 488 (1964).
111Id. at 814, 384 S.W.2d at 489, citing Lazenby v. Arkansas State High-
way Comm'n, supra, and other Arkansas cases. The court also cited WRIGHT,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 7.1, which is the section of the Digest in which cases on
special benefits are compiled.
"'See note 114 supra .
1"'3 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 8.6207.
CONCLUSION
In the short span of time since the Arkansas Eminent Domain
Digest was published, the Arkansas Supreme Court has decided a
number of important cases. The volume of condemnation litigation
in the state is not likely to diminish in the near future, due to the
construction of interstate highways, the improvement of the existing
state highway system, urban redevelopment, and the development
of the Arkansas River Valley. The trend in Arkansas, if anything,
seems toward a channelization of recovery within widely accepted
concepts of eminent domain and property law generally. Moreover,
the tendency seems to be to limit rather than broaden the base of
recovery. This trend or tendency was manifested in both the Grassy
Lake and McNeill cases. The McNeill case demonstrated the appli-
cation of the limiting factor even where recovery might have been
grounded upon interference with or destruction of a property right.
Whatever shortcomings may be apparent in isolated situations how-
ever, the public generally should benefit from this approach since
the alternative would greatly expand the amount of damages re-
covered in condemnation cases.
As this article illustrates, some of the major, recurring prob-
lems in Arkansas are of a procedural nature, and it is to be hoped
that many of these will be corrected through the enactment of the
highway code to be presented to the 1967 legislature. In that con-
nection it would seem that at the very least genuine procedural due
process should be obtained through the elimination of the antiquated
county condemnation procedure. Correction of this inadequacy, even
if the code did nothing else, would prove highly beneficial to Ar-
kansas landowners.
